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a
he 2008 housing market collapse
was monumental in its proportions and effects. 'The subprime
mortgage crisis led to the demise of
scores of banks and venerable financial institutions that had invested too
heavily in mortgage-backed securities.
'Those left standing are now the target of a plethora of lawsuits seeking to
lay blame for the collapse. 'The banks
are not alone. Regulators, government
agencies, and bond rating companies
have all been accused of contributing
to the financial crises; lawsuits against
these entities continue to mount. Even
participants on the periphery, such as
the Mortgage Electronic Registration
System, Inc. (MERS), being neither servicers nor originators of loans, have
been pulled into the litigation fray.
Whether MERS should rightfully
bear any blame for the crisis seems
beside the point. As the entity holding or enforcing a defaulted mortgage
that is in-or heading towardforeclosure, MERS has become an
obvious target for distraught borrowers and distressed debtors. These
borrowers have asser.ted hundreds
of offensive and defensive claims
against MERS, generally designed to
invalidate a defaulted mortgage or
bar foreclosure.
The hostility against MERS
revealed in many of these claims
apparently stems from the basic fact
that MERS makes transfers of mortgage loans possible without the
transparency of the public mortgage
recording system. But as the vast
majority of courts have now recognized, MERS's mortgage role is not

T

~

~
o

F

~

8

Shelby D. Green is an associate professor
at Pace Law School, White Plains, New
York, and editor of the "Keeping CurrentProperty" column in Probate & Property.
JoAnn T. Sandifer is a partner in the St.
Louis, Missouri, office of Husch Blackwell,
LLP.

fFo
By Shelby D. Green
and
JoAnn T. Sandifer
sinister or even unorthodox; rather,
it is grounded in traditional agency
relationships. And while that agency
relationship may vest MERS with
the power to exercise the lender's
rights in the mortgage, it was not created to facilitate improper transfers
of the loans or to shield information from borrowers or other market
participants.
MERSCORP Holdings, Inc., is a
privately held corporation that owns
and manages the MERS System. It is
a member-based organization made
up of about 3,000 lenders, servicers,
sub-services, investors, and government institutions. 'The MERS System
was conceived in 1993 by a group of
leading mortgage market participants,
including the Mortgage Bankers Association, the Federal National Mortgage
Association, the Federal Housing
Administration, the Department of
Veteran Affairs, JP Morgan Chase,
Bank of America, and Wells Fargo
Bank, that were looking for an efficient and reliable system for tracking
transfers of residential mortgages in
the increasingly securitized mortgage
market. What emerged was a system whereby MERS, a wholly-owned
subsidiary of MERSCORP Holdings, is designated as the mortgagee
of record serving for loans registered in the MERS System. MERS
does not hold the promissory note,
which means that it holds no beneficial interest in the loan transactions or
right of repayment; it merely serves
as nominee for the lender and the
lender's successors and assigns.

Land records are designed to show
subsequent transfers of mortgage
lien interests (not transfers of promissory notes or servicing rights). In
most states, transfers of mortgage
lien interests are not required to be
recorded, and transfer of notes and
servicing rights are evidenced in the
records of the parties involved.
Before MERS, when an interest
in a mortgage loan was transferred,
the parties would often change the
mortgagee by recording an assignment of the mortgage in the land
records. This process was time-consuming, costly, and liable to all the
vagaries of public recording, like misindexing and contested priorities. In
contrast, when a loan is registered
on the MERS System, MERS remains
the record mortgagee as nominee, or
agent, for the new beneficial owner
of the promissory note. MERS tracks
transfers in the underlying promissory note and the servicing rights
in MERS's electronic database. Borrowers have access to both a toll-free
number and an Internet web site
(www.mers-serviceid.org/ sis / index)
that provide the identity of the
servicer and, in many cases, the beneficial owner of their mortgage loans.
As MERS's web site states, MERS was
created "to streamline the mortgage
process by using electronic commerce
to eliminate paper." See About Us,
MERS, www.mersinc.org/about-us/
about-us.
Despite the simple premise of
the MERS System, opponents-or
those simply trying to invalidate
or forestall enforcement of their
mortgages-have leveled various
challenges to MERS's practices and
even its basic business model. Taking
an aerial view of the challenges, it is
possible to discern a certain pattern
as one challenge seemed to morph
into the next (often following rejection of the earlier one in the courts).
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Some borrowers have asserted that
MERS lacked legal standing to foreclose because it was a mere nominee
and not the owner of the note. Even
if MERS's legal standing was upheld,
borrowers pointed to the nominee
status as an empty formality, arguing
that it deprived MERS of the requisite beneficial interest to commence
foreclosure or assign the security
instrument, even to the holder who
had since acquired the beneficial
interest. When the lender or note
owner commenced foreclosures or
sought to enforce the lien instead of
MERS, borrowers still challenged
the security instrument, arguing that

MERS's designation as nominee constituted an impermissible split of the
note from the mortgage, rendering
both unenforceable.
From this distant vantage, all the
challenges might be viewed as permutations of the same theme-who
has the legal power and interest sufficient to enforce the security given
for a loan? The over arching response
is that MERS, as nominee or agent for
the beneficial owner, has the power to
enforce the lien and security interest.

Both of these challenges ignore the
basic idea of standing. One can rightfully invoke the jurisdiction of the
court where one holds, in an individual or representative capacity, some
real interest in the cause of action,
or a legal or equitable right, title, or
interest in the subject matter of the
controversy. RMS Residential Props.,
LLC v. Miller, 32 A.3d 307 (Conn.

2011); Trotter v. Bank ofN.Y. Mellon,
275 P.3d 857 (Idaho 2012). In other
words, standing requires that a litigant have a sufficient and adversarial
stake in the matter, with substantial
potential for real harm flowing from
the outcome of the case. Bank ofN.Y.
v. Raftogianis, 13 A.3d 435 (NJ Super.
Ct. Ch. Div. 2010); Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., Inc. v. Barnes, 940 N.E.2d
118 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010).
MERS's legal rights and interest in
the mortgage transaction are set out
in the security instrument executed
by the borrower at loan origination.
The standard language in a security
instrument registered in the MERS
System names MERS as "mortgagee,
solely as nominee for Lender and
Lender's successors and assigns" and
further states:
Borrower understands and
agrees that MERS holds only
legal title to the interests
granted by Borrower .... MERS
... has the right: to exercise any
or all of those interests, including, but not limited to, the right
to foreclose and sell a Property;
and to take any action required
of Lender including, but not
limited to, releasing and cancelling this [] Instrument.

MERS's Status as Nominee
for the Lender Provides
Standing to Foreclose

See Barnes, 940 N.E.2d at 120; Culhane v. Aurora Loan Servs. of Neb., 826

Standing, one of the earliest challenges to the MERS System, refers to
the legal right to set judiciallTIachinery in motion. Borrowers have
maintained that MERS lacks standing
because it is merely the nominee for
the lender and not the lender in fact
and that, as mere nominee, its lack of
a beneficial interest in the underlying
indebtedness means it has suffered
no injury by the default.

F. Supp. 2d 352, 370 (D. Mass. 2011),
aff'd, 708 F.3d 282 (1st Cir. 2013).
With such an express conferral
of the power to foreclose, why have
challenges to MERS's standing not
been dismissed out of hand? The use
of the term "nominee" may provide
the answer. The term is not widely
used or understood, and challengers
have pointed to what they perceive
as limitations inherent in that status.

20

PROBATE

&

PROPERTY. JULy/AUGUST

2013

They argue that the term is dichotomous: a nominee seeks the power
to foreclose because it stands in the
place of the lender, but does not have
the power to foreclose because it is
not the lender in fact. MERS cannot, it
is claimed, be both the agent and the
principal.
In discerning the meaning of
"nominee" in the MERS context,
courts have not confined their inquiry
to the text of the security instrument
but instead have consulted extrinsic sources, most notably Black's Law
Dictionary. See Edwards v. Mortgage
Elec. Registration Sys., 300 P.3d 43, 49
(Idaho 2013); U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Howie,
280 P.3d 225,231 (Kan. Ct. App. 2012);

Butler v. Deutsche Bank Trust Co. of
Ams., No. 12-10337-DPW, 2012 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 114196, at *21 (D. Mass.
Aug. 14,2012). "Nominee" is defined
as "[a] person designated to act in
place of another, usu. in a very limited way," or "[a] party who holds
bare legal title for the benefit of others." Black's Law Dictionary (9th ed.
2009). Thus, MERS is an agent for the
lender, and its successors and assigns,
for the limited purpose of holding
and enforcing the security agreement.
It holds the security instrument in its
own name, but it does so in a representative capacity.
Tha t MERS lacks an economic or
beneficial interest in the underlying indebtedness does not deprive
it of the standing this status confers. Although a few courts have
questioned MERS's interest in the
mortgage for purposes of asserting rights relating to the mortgage,

Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., Inc.
v. Southwest. Homes of Ark., Inc., 301
S.W.3d 1 (Ark. 2009), Mortgage Elec.
Registration Sys., Inc. v. Saunders, 2
A.3d 289, 295 (Me. 2010), Landmark
Nat'l Bank v. Kesler, 216 P.3d 158 (Kan.
2009), most courts confronted with
the issue have found that MERS's
status as record mortgagee, holding
legal and record title to the security
instrument and the power to act for
the note holder, is sufficient for MERS
to commence a foreclosure in its own
name. Edwards, 2013 WL 1760620, at

*16; Bucci v. Lehman Bros. Bank, FSB,
2013 WL 1498655, at *8-15 (RI. Apr.

12,2013); Eaton v. Federal Nat'l Mortg.
Ass'n, 969 N.E.2d 1118 (Mass. 2012);
In re Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc.,
No. A12-0387, 2012 WL 5289866, at *6
(Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 29,2012); Jack-

son v. Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys.,
Inc., 770 N.W.2d 487 (Minn. 2009);
Barnes, 940 N.E.2d 118. For instance,
the Minnesota Supreme Court held
that MERS has the ability to institute
foreclosure by advertisement because
"a party can hold legal title to the security instrument without holding an
interest in the promissory note." Jackson,
770 N.W.2d at 500-1. The Rhode Island
Supreme Court has agreed, holding
that MERS had the contractual authority to foreclose under the terms of the
mortgage. Bucci,2013 WL 1498655, at
*8-15. Likewise, in Edwards, the Idaho
Supreme Court upheld the dismissal of
the brrower' s challenge to a nonjudicial
foreclosure and rejected the borrowers' argument that MERS could not act
as the beneficiary on the deed of trust
absent an interest in the promissory
note. 2013 WL 1760620, at *4-5.
Thus, MERS's lack of an economic
interest in the loan is beside the point.
MERS's status as mortgagee with
authority to act on behalf of the party
that holds that economic interest is
the key. Courts have explained that,
because MERS "enforce[s] the mortgage on behalf of the owner of the note,
a party that is unquestionably entitled
to enforce the obligation the mortgage
secures[,]" MERS has the power to foreclose, Bucci, 2013 WL 1498655, at *16,
and that foreclosure can be brought by
MERS even though beneficial ownership of the note is in another. Barnes, 940
N.E.2d 118. These courts are cognizant
of the difference between ownership of
an interest in the note and "ownership
of the mortgage" and have explained
that the latter is sufficient to render
MERS a real party in interest, with
standing to foreclose. See, e.g., Residential Funding Co., LLC v. Saurman, 805
N.W.2d 183, 184 (Mich. 2011); Culhane
v. Aurora Loan Services, 708 F.3d 282 (1st
Cir. 2013) ("The mortgage need not possess any scintilla of a beneficial interest
in order to hold the mortgage").
In jurisdictions that require evidence
of the promissory note as a prerequisite
to a judicial foreclosure, foreclosure of

a MERS mortgage requires that same
proof. See, e.g., U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Alexander, 280 P.3d 936 (Okla. 2012); U.S.
Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Kimball, 27 A.3d 1087
(Vt. 2011). The holder of the mortgage
must demonstrate rightful possession
of the promissory note as the original
payee, assignee by a valid assignment,
or lawful holder of the note. In re Miller
v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co., 666 F.3d
1255 (10th Cir. 2012); CPT Asset Backed
Certificates v. Cin Kham, 278 P.3d 586
(Okla. 2012); Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust
Co. v. Richardson, 273 P.3d 50 (Okla.
2012). In deed of trust jurisdictions, in
which foreclosures take place by power
of sale, courts have been nearly uniform
in ruling that the party commencing
foreclosure need not possess the promissory note. See, e.g., Burnett v. Mortgage
Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 706 F.3d 1231,
1243 (10th Cir. 2013). These courts recognize that the original parties are free
to contract at the outset to have someone other than the beneficial owner of
the debt act on behalf of that owner to
enforce rights granted in the security
instrument. Id.; see also Patterson v. CitiMortgage, Inc., No. 1:11-CV-0339-CC,
2012 WL 4468750, at *12 (ND. Ga. Sept.
26, 2012) (possession or holding the
note not required). According to these
cases, when a deed of trust expressly
provides for MERS to have the power
of sale, then MERS has the power of
sale. See Grubbs v. CitiMortgage, Inc., No.
4:12CV472,2012 WL5463865 (ED. Tex.
Nov. 8,2012).
In a few limited cases, when a foreclosure statute prescribes specific
interests required to invoke the statute,
courts have interpreted the language to
require that the foreclosing party hold
an economic interest in the underlying
debt. The Washington Supreme Court,
in Bain v. Metropolitan Mortgage Group,
Inc., 285 P.3d 34 (Wash. 2012) (en banc),
read the trust deed statute quite literally
and found that "MERS is an ineligible 'beneficiary' within the terms of
the Washington Deed of Trust Act, if it
never held the promissory note or other
debt instrument secured by the deed
of trust." Id. at 47. Similarly; in Niday
v. GMAC Mortgage, LLC, 284 P.3d 1157
(Or. Ct. App. 2012), the Oregon Court
of Appeals read "beneficiary" of a trust
deed, for purposes of the Oregon Trust

Deed Act, to mean the person named or
otherwise designated in the trust deed
as the person to whom the secured
obligation is owed, that is, the original
lender. Id. at 1164. When the beneficiary assigns its interest in the trust
deed without recording that assignment, under Or. Rev. Stat. § 86.735(1), a
predicate to nonjudicial foreclosure may
not be satisfied. Id. at 1169. These cases,
however, are the exception rather than
the rule, and they have been construed
narrowly. See Zalac v. CTX Mortg. Corp.,
No. C12-01474 MJP, 2013 WL562892
(W.o. Wash. Feb. 14,2013) (distinguishing Bain and dismissing claim that
MERS's role on deed of trust violated
the state consumer protection act).
As a general rule, the broad language
in a MERS security instrument establishes that MERS, the record mortgagee
as nominee for the lender, possesses
and can assert all the powers of a mortgagee, including the power to foreclose.
The vast majority of the courts have recognized this, and challenges to MERS's
standing to foreclose have accordingly dwindled. Nevertheless, MERS
has recently amended its Membership
Rules to require that, before initiation
of any foreclosure, the security instrument must be assigned from MERS to
the note owner or servicer. Foreclosures
may no longer be initiated in MERS's
name. See MERS System Rules of Membership Rule 8 (2011 amendment).

MERS Has the Authority to
ASSign the Security Instrument
Even before the rule change above,
MERS often assigned the mortgage
or deed of trust to the note owner or
holder in anticipation of foreclosure.
This provided yet another basis for
challenge by defaulting borrowers-the
claim that MERS lacks the authority to assign the security instrument.
Although courts will scrutinize the form
and sufficiency of the actual assignment
between note holders, Citimortgage, Inc.
v. Stosel, 934 N.y'S.2d 182 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2011) (failure to prove ownership
of the note by delivery or valid assignment), they have had little difficulty
finding MERS's power to assign the
security instrument as inherent in the
powers originally granted. In Culhane,
the First Circuit held that MERS had
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the authority "twice over" to assign the
Mortgage Follows the Note,
mortgage. This authority derived frm
But Note Holder Can Appoint
MERS's status as equitable trustee for
Another to Enforce
the note holder and from the terms of As a general rule, a promissory note
the mortgage contract. 708 F.3d at 293. and the mortgage securing it are
The Bankruptcy Court for the Disinseparable; the transfer of the note is
trict of Wyoming also addressed the
deemed to transfer the right to enforce
issue of "whether MERS had authorthe mortgage as well. But this does not
ity to assign the mortgage to the [loan prevent the note holder from appointservicing company], on behalf of the
ing another to hold and enforce the
Lender.... " In re Relka, No. 09-20806,
mortgage on its behalf. The Restate2009 WL 5149262, at *4 (Bankr. D.
ment of Property expresses the widely
held principle that "[a] transfer of an
Wyo. Dec. 22, 2009). Relying on the
obligation secured by a mortgage also
standard language in a MERS security instrument, the court concluded
transfers the mortgage unless the parties
that "[0]ne of the actions that this Court to the transfer agree otherwise," Restatewould include in this non-exclusive
ment (Third) of Property: Mortgages
§ 5.4(a) (emphasis added), but that "[a]
listing of rights, is the right to assign
the mortgage." Id. at *5.
mortgage may be enforced only by, or
Alternatively, courts often find the
in behalf of, a person who is entitled to
power to assign immillle from chalenforce the obligations the mortgage
secures." Id. § 5.4(c).
lenge by one who is not a party to the
assignment. Allemon v. Countrywide
When the mortgage and the right of
Home Loans, Inc., No. 11-15400,2012 WL enforcement of the obligation it secures
5300344, at *4 (ED. Mich. Oct. 25,2012); are separated, the separation typically
but see Culhane, 708 F.3d 289-91 (mortprecludes the holder of the note from
gagor has standing to challenge the
foreclosing and results in a practical
loss of the efficacy of the mortgage. But
assignment of a mortgage to the extent
"this result is changed if [a party] has
necessary to contest a foreclosing entiauthority ... to enforce the mortgage
ty's status quo mortgagee, by showing
the assignment was void because
on ... behalf [of the holder of the note]."
Id. § 5.4, cmt. e. Thus, as the Restatethe assignor had nothing to assign or
lacked authority to assign, but not by
ment explains, there is no separation
showing that an assignment, otherwise in that scenario, and the note remains
effective to pass legal title, was merely
secured because the party holding the
mortgage has the authority to enforce
voidable at the election of one party).
the mortgage for the owner or holder
MERS's Role as Nominee
of the note. For example, the named
Does Not Sever the Note
mortgagee "may be a trustee or agent
and Mortgage
of [the note holder] with responsibility to enforce the mortgage at [the note
Because the challenges to MERS's
right to foreclose and its ability to
holder's] direction." Id.
assign have been largely illlsuccessThe Restatement explains that this
ful, defaulting borrowers turned to a
position aims to avoid the economically
wasteful consequences of an illlenmore flUldamental attack on the MERS
forceable mortgage; the common law
System. They claim that MERS's stastrives to achieve unity of the note and
tus as the mortgagee on the security
instrument separates the ownermortgage interests even if the courts
must supply gaps in the documents.
ship of the note and the mortgage
and renders the mortgage illlenforceId. In fact, although the Restatement
able. The prevalence of this argument
acknowledges "rare occasions" when
the mortgagee may wish to disassociis somewhat surprising because an
arrangement whereby a note holder
ate the obligation and mortgage, "that
appoints another to enforce the obligaresult should follow only upon evitions illlder the note was not invented
dence that the parties to the transfer so
by MERS, but, rather, is a long-standing agreed." Id § 5.4 cmt. a. The Restatement urges courts to be vigorous in
practice in mortgage transactions that
seeking to find such "a[n agency]
is well-groilllded in agency law.
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relationship, since the result is otherwise likely to be a windfall for the
mortgagor and the frustration of [the
note owner's] expectation of security."
Id. § 5.4 cmt. e.
The plain language of MERS's standard security instrument does not
establish an intent to separate the note
and the mortgage. The very opposite
is true.
Agency Relation Results from
the Powers Granted in the
Deed of Trust
As the Restatement suggests, a fatal
split can also be avoided by examining the relation between the nominee
and lender illlder the lens of agency
law. An agency relationship exists when
a principal (the original lender) manifests assent to have another, MERS (the
agent), act on its behalf, subject to the
principal's control and consent of the
agent. Restatement (Third) of Agency
§ 1.01. An agent can act on behalf of
both a disclosed principal (the original
lender) and a later unidentified principal (lender's successor and assign). Id.
§ 1.04. A MERS mortgage names MERS
as the mortgagee in its capacity as nominee for the defined "lender" illlder
the mortgage, and for the lender's successors and assigns-the subsequent
transferees of the note. That the parties used the term "nominee" instead
of "agent" makes no difference, as the
label affixed to the relation does not
determine the nature of that relationship. rd. § 1.02. Instead, "the legal status
of a nominee depends on the context
of the relationship of the nominee to its
principal." Howie, 280 P.3d at 231 (quoting Landmark Nat'l Bank v. Kesler, 216
P.3d 158, 166 (Kan. 2009)); Restatement
(Third) Agency § 1.02 cmt. b.
As one court explained, the standard
language in a MERS security instrument "is more than sufficient to create
an agency relationship between MERS
and the Lender and its successors in Missouri, regardless [sic] what term they
used to describe that relationship." In
re Tucker,441 B.R. 638, 645 (Bankr. WD.
Mo. 2010) (emphasis added). All subsequent note holders take subject to
the agency relationship created in the
deed of trust. "[T]he effect of the MERS
system in Missouri is that even if, as

here, the deed of trust is recorded in
the name of the original lender ... the
holder of the note, whoever it is, would
be entitled to foreclose, even if the deed
of trust had not been assigned to it." Id.
at 644-45.
Moreover, MERS's role as mortgagee for another is not novel. It is
common practice for a trustee or
straw man to hold a mortgage interest in the land records on behalf of
another. Both before and since MERS
was created, servicers on loans have
often held the record interest in mortgages on behalf of the beneficial
owners of the loans.
MERS's Governing Rules
Confirm the Agency
Relationship

MERS's rules of membership confirm the agency relationship created
in the security instrument. The rules
provide that MERS's members "shall
cause [MERS] to appear in the applicable public land records as the
Mortgagee of Record as Nominee
for the Note Owner and its successors and/ or assigns with respect to
each Mortgage loan that the Member registers on the MERS System,"
and that "[i]n the absence of countrary instructions from the Note
owner, MESRCORP Holdings, and
MERS may rely on instructions from
the Servicer or Subservicer shown
on the MERS System with respect
to transfers of legal title of the note
or mortgage, transfers of contractual servicing rights, and releases of
any security interests applicable to
such mortgage loan." MERS Rules of
Membership, Rule 2, §§ 4 & 5 (Mar.
2013).
These rules are incorporated into
lenders' membership agreements.
The deed of trust and membership agreements authorize MERS to
perform specific delegable acts for
the lender and its assigns, including holding legal title to the deed of
trust and exercising any of the rights
granted to the lender thereunder.
MERS does so at the direction and
control of the note owner. In this way,
the holder of the note, the principal,
always retains the right to enforce the
secured obligation. The courts have

found that these rules confirm the
agency relationship between MERS
and its members, noting that the
lenders" signed up for this agency
relationship in their membership
agreements." Tucker, 441 B.R. at 646.
Severance Arguments
Made and Rejected

The Kansas Supreme Court's decision
in Landmark National Bank v. Kesler, 216
P.3d 158 (Kan. 2009), fueled MERS's
"severance" argument, though the case
is generally cited solely for the stray
dicta it contains. There, the trustee
under the first deed of trust (Landmark) filed a petition to foreclose but
did not serve either MERS, the nominee for the lender under a second deed
of trust, or the assignee of the note
(Sovereign) on the second loan. Sovereign sought to set aside the default
judgment and sheriff's sale on the
ground that MERS was a contingently
necessary party under Kan. Stat. Ann.
§ 60-219(a). The Kansas Supreme
Court held that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in denying the
motion to vacate. Because MERS had
not demonstrated a direct, ascertainable loss from the foreclosure, it failed
to establish the predicate for setting
aside a judgment. Id. at 169-70.
In dicta, the court commented on
MERS's role, likening it more to a
"straw man than to a party possessing all the rights given a buyer" and
stating that MERS had few rights, if
any, other than acting on behalf of the
lender to secure the lender's rights
when necessary. Id. at 166. Although
the court did not determine whether
any severance existed in that case, it
surmised that "in the event" that the
mortgage loan somehow becomes
separated from the security interest, the mortgage "may" become
unenforceable. Id. at 166-67. In so
doing, the court did not otherwise
examine the relevant language of the
mortgage and MERS's membership
agreements with the lender. A close
reading of the case reveals that reliance on that case in support of the
proposition that naming MERS as
nominee works a severance of the
mortgage from the note is surely misplaced. Rather than a broad policy

position, the case was in fact decided
on something very mundane-procedure. Thus, Landmark merely stated
the uncontroversial proposition that
the enforceability of a MERS mortgage may turn on the relationship
between MERS and the holder of the
note.
Bellistri v. Ocwen Loan Servicing,
LLC, 284 S.W.3d 619 (Mo. Ct. App.
2009), is also frequently cited on
the severance issue, again inaptly.
There, the court of appeals held that
Ocwen, the assignee of the deed of
trust, lacked standing to challenge
a quiet title judgment following a
tax sale absent evidence of the ownership of the promissory note. The
court stated, in dicta, that the "practical effect of splitting the deed of
trust from the promissory note is to
make it impossible for the holder of
the note to foreclose, unless the holder
of the deed of trust is the agent of the
holder of the note." Id. at 623 (emphasis added) (citing Restatement (Third)
of Property: Mortgages § 5.4). As in
Landmark, the Bellistri court did not
decide whether an agency relationship existed that would validate the
note under the cited Restatement
provision because there was no evidence regarding the current holder
of the note. Id. at 623. In a subsequent suit filed by MERS in federal
court to set aside the tax sale, when
evidence was presented to establish
that MERS held legal title to the deed
of trust on behalf of the note owner
and note holder, the district court
held that MERS was entitled to bring
suit to redress the injury to its principal and had standing to challenge
the very same tax sale. Mortgage Elec.
Registration Sys., Inc. v. Bellistri, No.
4:09-CV-731 CAS, 2010 WL 2720802,
at *15 (ED. Mo. July 1, 2010).
Other courts from these jurisdictions, both federal and state, have
rejected the severance argument
alluded to in Landmark and Bellistri I.
In U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Howie, 280 P.3d
225, the Kansas Court of Appeals held
that MERS's role as mortgagee, as nominee for the lender, did not sever the
interests in the note and the mortgage.
The court found that the agency relationship was created by the mortgage
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itself, which "explicitly authorize[d]
MERS to act on behalf of U.S. Bank in
all situations related to the enforcement of the Mortgage." Id. at 230.
Howie acknowledged the potential
issue of severance raised in Landmark,
but explained that there could be no
severance when the beneficial interest in the mortgage and note remained
vested in the original lender and its
successors and assigns by the clear
language of both the note and the
mortgage. Id. at 227; see also MetLife
Home Loans, 286 P.3d at 1157 (the
existence of an agency relationship
between MERS and lender's assignee
was evidenced by the language of the
mortgage itself, which clearly stated
that the borrowers mortgaged the
listed property "to MERS, solely as
nominee for [lender] and [lender's1 successors and assigns").
Similarly, in In re Martinez v. Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., after
a thorough review of Kansas law,
including the Restatement of Property and other relevant authority, the
court held that no severance of the
note and the mortgage occurred in
light of the language of the mortgage
itself and MERS's membership agreements with the original lender and its
successors and assigns. 444 B.R. 192
(Bankr. D. Kan. 2011). Instead, "MERS
was clearly acting as an agent for [the
lender] at all relevant times," holding the mortgage as "nominee" for the
lender and agreeing to act on the lender's behalf and at its direction with
respect to the mortgage. Id. at 205.
"The fact that MERS and [the lender]
chose to use the word 'nominee,'
rather than 'agent,' [did] not alter the
underlying relationship between the
two parties," especially given the fact
that the two terms have nearly identical legal definitions. Id. at 205-06. "[T]
he [n]ote and [m]ortgage were never
split, and remain[ed] enforceable." Id.
at 206.
These rulings reflect the sensible
position that, absent fraud, a mortgage may be held by MERS or another
nominee for the security of the real
creditor, whether the creditor is the
person named as mortgagee or some
other party, so far as the nature of the
transaction is reasonably disclosed. In
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Cervantes, 656 F.3d 1034, the court
explained that because the designation of MERS as nominee appears on
the face of the security instrument, no
credence would be given to claims
of fraud or sham, nor claims that the
borrower was misinformed or suffered any injury from either MERS's
role as a beneficiary or the possibility
that their loans would be resold and
tracked through the MERS System.
This rule protects the important
goal of facilitating mortgage transactions and recognizes that to hold such
mortgages void would frustrate the
intentions of both mortgagors and
mortgagees. RMS Residential, 32 A.3d
at 317. There is simply no reason that
"the original parties to the Note and
Deed of Trust cannot validly contract
at the outset 'to have someone other
than the beneficial owner of the debt
act on behalf of that owner to enforce
rights granted in [the security instrument].'" Commonwealth, 680 F.3d at
1204; Horvath v. Bank of N. Y., 641 F.3d
617,620 (4th Cir. 2011); Trent v. Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 288 F.
App'x 571, 572 (11th Cir. 2008). Instead,
as one court recently noted, "the
choice of a mortgagee is a matter of
convenience." Residential Funding, 805
N.W.2d at 184 ("It has never been necessary that the mortgage should be
given directly to the beneficiaries. The
security is always made in trust to
secure obligations, and the trust and
the beneficial interest need not be in
the same hands .... ") (quoting Adams
v. Niemann, 8 N.W. 719, 720 (Mich.
1881)).
In a somewhat different take on the
issue, the Nevada Supreme Court has
found that the designation of MERS
as nominee does split the note and
deed of trust at inception because an
entity separate from the note holder is
listed as the beneficiary and thus the
deed of trust cannot be enforced. Edelstein v. Bank ofN.Y Mellon, 286 P.3d 249
(Nev. 2012). The court points out, however, that this split is not irreparable
or fatal, but can be cured by having MERS assign, under its powers as
agent, its beneficial interest in the deed
of trust to the holder of the note. See id.
at 252. The rejoined interests are then
enforceable.

The Future of MERS
The flood of foreclosures following the 2008 housing crisis deluged
MERS with hundreds, if not thousands, of claims from defaulting
buyers seeking to avoid their mortgage obligations. MERS has survived,
generally defeating the various
permutations of the attacks on its
business model and defending the
validity of the mortgages registered
on its system. As the courts have consistently recognized, MERS's role as
mortgagee is nothing more than that
of an agent holding the mortgage for
its principal. And in so doing, MERS
has benefitted borrowers by streamlining the mortgage recording process
and reducing the costs associated
with mortgage transactions.
Though few of the borrowers' challenges against MERS have prevailed,
these challenges-and the broader
challenges against the lending institutions-have sparked considerable
debate on a variety of issues, such as
what amount of disclosure to the borrower is necessary when entering into
mortgage transactions, what systems
or protocols are warranted for dealing
with a borrower in financial distress,
and whether existing rules on negotiable instruments are suitable for
transfers of mortgages. These issues
have led to a number of institutional
changes, mostly in the practices of
the lenders. See State Attorneys General, Feds Reach $25 Billion Settlement
with Five Largest Mortgage Servicers
on Foreclosure Wrongs, Nat'l Ass'n of
Att'ys Gen. (last visited Apr. 20, 2013),
http://naag.org/state-attorneysgeneral-feds-reach-25-billion-settle
ment-with-five-Iargest-mortgageservicers-on-foreclosure-wrongs.php.
Some changes have affected MERS
administration and delivery of services to its members. See Consent
Order for In the Matter of MERSCORp,
Inc., OCC No. AA-EC-11-20 (Apr. 13,
2011), www.occ.gov/news-issuances/
news-releases / 2011 / nr-occ-2011-47h.
pdf. These institutional changes will
shore up the greater efficiency and
reliability of the MERS System, which
remains an essential player in the
mortgage industry.•

